In the recent past, there have been countless instances of arms transfers to countries with problematic human rights records, many of which have been cited in the reports of various advocacy groups. However, so far, the amount of research classifying these flows has been limited. This study examines the trends between 1999 and 2003 in arms transfer to countries with poor human rights records, as well as the reasons for continuation of these transfers. It puts forward two major arguments for these transfers to such countries. First, the national and international codes ostensibly "prohibiting" transfers to these countries are crafted in a way that eventually plays into the hands of the countries and manufacturers that want to transfer. Second, the end of the Cold War has turned the arms transfer market into a buyer's market more than ever. The declining domestic military spending experienced in most of the seller countries has forced arms manufacturers to pursue markets beyond their borders, sometimes even illegally and illicitly.
importantly, the United States, a country that is considered to have the most sophisticated laws on arms transfers, decided to lift the sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan after 11 September 2001 and resumed the transfer of arms to both of these countries as new allies of the United States in the "War Against Terrorism." 8 The examples of arms transfers to countries with problematic human rights records are countless. There are many more contextual examples cited in the reports of various advocacy groups, 9 but so far, there has been limited research classifying these flows. This article examines the trends between 1999 and 2003 in arms transfer to countries with poor human rights records and the reasons for the continuation of these transfers in spite of the presence of various international and national laws ostensibly "prohibiting" transfers to these countries. Some statistical studies have argued that after the end of the Cold War, the United States started to pay attention to human rights conditions in recipient countries; and thus, "countries that abuse human rights were less likely to be recipients of American arms."
10 While these statistical studies tend to classify arms transfers as "less likely," when we look at the practice, most supplier countries, including the United States, eventually uphold their commercial and national security concerns and turn their backs on human rights concerns that they have long championed.
The relation between arms transfers and the exacerbation of conflicts and human rights violations has long been an established fact. relation between arms trade and human rights forced supplier countries, which correspond mostly to the most developed countries of the world, to enact various laws and codes at the national and international level. For example, supplier countries enacted laws prohibiting or "discouraging" arms transfers to countries with poor human rights records. Despite all of these laws and codes, supplier countries do transfer conventional weapons to countries with dubious human rights records. This practice, in most cases, eventually creates a cycle that worsens human rights conditions in these recipient countries. This article is composed of eight sections. After this brief introduction, the second section introduces the article's methodology. The third and fourth sections examine the top ten suppliers of conventional arms between 1999 and 2003, followed by the top sixty recipients of conventional arms during these years and their share in global arms transfers, as well as human rights records in these countries. The fifth section discusses arms exports laws and codes in major supplier countries at the domestic and international levels. While discussing these laws, special attention is paid to whether these laws and codes consider human rights conditions in recipient countries. The sixth and seventh sections analyze the changing dynamics of the post-Cold War global arms trade, including the black and gray markets for small arms. Finally, the conclusion reiterates the findings and arguments and describes current attempts to regulate conventional arms transfers globally.
While making this analysis regarding arms transfers to countries with poor human rights and conflict zones, I develop two main arguments as factors that contribute to the continuation of arms transfers to such countries. First, as will be elaborated in detail below, national and international codes are crafted in a way that creates an enormous space in which supplier countries can maneuver. The laws, whether national or international, are in place in theory; but when one looks at the way in which these laws are crafted, they are open to interpretation. Second, with the end of the Cold War, the global conventional arms market has become an unprecedented buyer's market. The Cold War created a decline in domestic military expenditures and forced arms manufacturers to look beyond their own domestic markets. This decline was much worse in the countries of the former Soviet Union and in some Eastern European countries. These countries ended up looking for customers around the world more aggressively and sometimes more illegally and more illicitly than ever before. These legal, illegal, and illicit alternatives not only reduce compliance with laws and regulations that are supposed to impede arms transfers, but faced with competition, legal and illegal, major supplier countries are more unwilling to come up with tighter laws and regulations at national and international levels that might entirely halt transfers to countries with poor human rights records.
II. THE METHod
This article utilizes several different databases and rankings. First, to rank top supplier and recipient countries between 1999 and 2003, the article uses the rankings provided by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Chapter 12 of their SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Because the article examines whether the top ten suppliers of global arms were equipped with laws and regulations, both at the national and international level, it took human rights conditions in the recipient country into consideration; the laws by which these countries were bound nationally and internationally were checked from the National Export Control Table, which can be accessed at the SIPRI website. 12 The results are reflected in Figure 1 below.
Second, the article determines the top arms recipients with problematic human rights records by matching the top sixty recipients rankings between the years 1999 and 2003 with the rankings of the Freedom House between 1999 and 2003 (see Figure 2) . 13 The article utilizes the same categorizations (Free, Partly Free, and Not Free) used in the Freedom House Report. 14 Furthermore, because conflicts and human rights violations go hand in hand, the article tracks whether an internal or an external conflict existed in these countries between 1999 and 2003. For this, the author mainly relied on the International Peace Research Institute's armed conflict database.
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III. THE SUPPLIERS
The end of the Cold War led to a decline in the volume of arms transfers around the world. In 1988, $35 billion worth of arms was transferred globally. 16 This number was reduced to $20 billion in 1995 and has been 12. SIPRI, National Export Control 18 During the same period, Russia ranked second with a 30 percent share, followed by France with a 7.2 percent share in global arms transfers. 19 Germany and the United Kingdom ranked fourth and fifth, respectively, with almost a 5.9 percent and a 4.8 percent share each. 20 Ukraine's share was almost 2.5 percent, followed by Italy at seventh with a 1.9 percent share.
21 China, the largest importer of arms, with a 1.7 percent share, ranked as the eighth supplier.
22
The Netherlands and Canada ranked ninth and tenth, respectively, with a 1.4 percent share each. All top supplier countries have domestic laws regulating arms exports. However, only the laws in the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Canada stipulate that when exporting arms, the licensing authorities must consider human rights records in the recipient country.
26 With the exception of China, all top supplier countries have become parties to various international codes and regimes. These international regimes and codes, again to varying degrees, also urge these countries to take human rights conditions in recipient countries into consideration when transferring arms. These regimes and codes are: the European Union (EU) Code of Conduct, 27 the Wassenaar Agreement, 28 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Principles, 29 and the United Nations (UN) Register. 30 After examining the top suppliers and recipients, the article examines these national laws and international regimes and how they approach the issue of human rights in the recipient country to which arms are being transferred. Figure 2 , below, details the top sixty recipients of arms in the world between 1999 and 2003, human rights conditions in these countries, and the presence or the absence of a conflict (internal or external) in these countries. These top sixty countries received almost 96 percent of the arms globally transferred during this period. Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, *Denotes a major supplier (more than 50% of all arms transfers) to this country.
IV. THE REcIpIENTS: THE cLIENTS: THE "BEST" BUYERS
FIGURE III
The Suppliers and the Recipients 41 
Suppliers
Recipients with Poor Human Rights Records and/or Conflict
As demonstrated in Figure 3 , between 1999 and 2003, the United States supplied arms to nine of the thirty-two countries classified as Not Free or Partly Free and/or with a conflict. Russia provided arms to twenty countries; France to twelve; Germany to five; the United Kingdom to nine; Ukraine to ten; Italy to nine; China to five; the Netherlands to six; and Canada to three. While Russia ranked second and supplied 30 percent of all the arms transferred globally between 1999 and 2003, it had the most diversified client portfolio.
Why do major suppliers, given their diversified portfolios, and despite the proven adverse effects of supplying arms to countries in conflict and/or with poor human rights records, continue supply weapons to these nations?
There are several reasons. First, as described below, almost all of the major suppliers follow domestic and international codes that, to some degree, force the officials of the state issuing arms export licenses to consider human rights conditions in the recipient country. However, these laws and regulations fail to stop the arms transfers to such countries because of their elastic wording. Second, the end of the Cold War contributed to a decline in domestic military expenditures in the major supplier countries, leading manufacturers and suppliers of arms to market their products more aggressively in the global market. The situation was more acute for the former communist countries because of their dependency on arms exports as their major export. This dependency forced them to pursue marketing policies, sometimes illegal and illicit, especially in small arms.
V. THE LAwS
As stated above, with the exception of Russia, China, and Ukraine, all top ten supplier countries have national legislation that urge the export license-issuing authorities to consider human rights conditions, albeit to varying degrees, in recipient countries. These laws have one point in common: their openness to interpretation that creates uncertainty about whether the law in question will be applied. This, in a sense, indicates the unwillingness of countries with greater stakes in global arms transfers to create stricter laws.
A. National codes on Arms Transfers in Top Supplier countries
Among supplier countries, the United States is probably the country with the most sophisticated laws on arms exports that leave the country either as a foreign military sales (FMS) (i.e., sale directly from the US government to another government) or direct commercial sale (i.e., sale from US arms manufacturers to public or private persons around the world). There are The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 regulates foreign (economic and military) assistance from the United States to other countries. The Act states that the foreign policy goal of the United States is "to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries." 47 The second part of the Act stipulates that "no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." 48 However, the very same paragraph grants the President the right to make exceptions when necessary.
49
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is considered the main law that directly regulates the arms exports of the United States.
50 Section 2751 of the Code states that arms transfers can only take place if they are "consistent" with the principles set forth in Section 2304. 51 ing should indicate that when the individual responsible for human rights violations is "expelled" from the "unit," the funding of the "unit" could continue. 61 The second weakness of the Leahy Amendment is that it is not a permanent feature of either the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act or the Defense Operation Act. The amendment must be reintroduced every year with the respective Foreign Operations Appropriations and Defense Appropriations Acts. The Leahy Law has been applied to military assistance to several countries. For example, assistance to Colombia has been condition on the certification of the improvement of human rights in the country by the US Secretary of State.
62 However, the efficiency of this certification procedure has been debated by various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In a July 2003 statement, Human Rights Watch (HRW) argued that these certifications were being issued by the Secretary of State without improvement in human rights conditions.
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In 1939, France began drafting a series of laws to regulate its arms exports. 64 The "Statement on French policy on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Items Submitted to the Wassenaar Arrangement" stipulates that France would exhibit "respect for the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, human rights, embargoes and other globally-agreed restrictive measures, arms control, and non-contribution to regional instability or to the prolongation of ongoing armed conflicts." 65 Furthermore, the same "Statement" notes that France "complies with the criteria laid down by the United Nations, the OSCE and the European Council" and " [respects] human rights in the country of final destination."
66 Similarly, before recommending a transaction to the Prime Minister, the Committee on the Export of War Weapons (CIEEMG) should evaluate human rights conditions in the recipient country.
67
Like France, the United Kingdom has laws governing arms exports dating from 1939.
68 The most recent of these laws that makes direct reference to In these articles the phrases "having a relevant consequence" or "such a consequence" refer to a wide range of instances ranging from "having an adverse effect on the national security of the United Kingdom and other countries" to the "breaches of international law and human rights."
71 Although there is a direct reference to human rights in this law, the ambiguous wording "may be imposed" creates uncertainty about the applicability of the law.
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Italian laws that regulate arms transfers and exports, enacted in 1990, also make a direct reference to human rights conditions in the recipient country. Italian Law 185 "forbids" arms exports to states "whose governments are responsible for proven violations of international human rights conventions." 80 It further states that human rights conditions in recipient countries are a "key factor" in the issuing of exports licenses. 81 According to these Policy Principles, export licenses "will not be granted where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that they may be used for internal repression as defined in the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, or the sustained and systematic abuse of human rights." 82 However, the second section, which sets the guidelines for arms exports to "NATO members, EU members, and countries with NATO-equivalent status," has more ambiguous language regarding human rights conditions in recipient countries. 83 This section stipulates that
[the] Federal Government will raise objections against . . . exports where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that they may be used for internal repression as defined by the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports or the sustained and systematic abuse of human rights.
84
The third section of the Policy Principles dealing with arms transfers to "other countries" uses the same ambiguous language:
Export licenses pursuant to the War Weapons Control Act and/or the Foreign Trade and Payments Act will not be granted where the internal situation in the country concerned precludes such action, e.g. in the case of armed conflict or where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such exports may be used for internal repression or the sustained and systematic abuse of human rights. In this context the human rights situation in the recipient country is a major factor to be considered. While Dutch laws reiterate "the international commitments" of the country, 86 the latest available arms export policy report issued by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs states that "applications for licenses for the export of military equipment are assessed on a caseby-case basis against the eight criteria of the arms export policy with due consideration for the nature of the product, its country of final destination and end user."
87 The same report goes on to list the eight criteria of the EU Code of Conduct, which include "the respect of human rights in the country of final destination."
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Canadian arms exports are regulated by "guidelines" set forth in the Export and Import Act of the country. The Act states that Canada closely controls the export of military goods and technology to countries that . . . have governments that have a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.
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By adding the "unless" clause, Canadian laws, like the laws of other nations, create room for interpretation. Yet when it comes to exporting firearms, Canada has a slightly different procedure. According to the Canadian Automatic Firearms Country Control List, Canadian manufacturers can sell their automatic firearms to only sixteen countries. 90 Among major supplier countries, only Russian, Chinese, and Ukrainian arms exports laws do not directly refer to human rights conditions in the recipient country. The closest that Russian law comes to mentioning human rights is in Article 6 of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation With Foreign States. This article stipulates, again very ambiguously, that the Russian president will work to "support the execution of decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations on action to maintain or restore international peace and security and also to protect the national interests of the Russian Fed- eration." 91 In a similar fashion, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Administration of Arms Exports stipulate that while conducting the arms trade, "no injury to the peace, security and stability of the region concerned and the world as a whole" should ensue. 92 Ukraine has various laws directing arms exports, none of which refer to human rights conditions in the recipient country. 93 In summary, there are various national laws that tell these major supplier countries to consider human rights conditions in recipient countries, albeit in ambiguous language. Similar language can be found in international codes. However, it can be argued that the language and usage of international codes are much more flexible than national laws and codes.
B. International codes and Regimes on Arms Transfers
The end of the Cold War saw the creation of a series of laws and regimes in arms exports. These new laws and regimes were in part due to pressure from civil society, in part due to the optimistic environment created in the aftermath of the Cold War in which East-West conflict looked like a distant memory, and in part due to various arms transfer scandals. Unfortunately, these regimes, codes, and laws at the international level have not reached their stated goal of creating a more responsible legal environment for arms transfers.
UN Register of Conventional Arms (1992)
The goal of the UN Register of Conventional Arms was to create a medium in which both supplier and recipient states disclose information about their sales and purchases, as well as their domestic arms production and holdings. 94 It is not, in other words, a regime prohibiting or discouraging arms transfers to countries with imperfect human rights per se, but simply an exercise encouraging transparency of conventional arms transfers, as well as holdings and production. However, participating in the UN Register of Conventional Arms is voluntary, meaning that states may choose not to participate at all or that they can participate only when they wish to do so. the Register has created debates about the efficiency and the effectiveness of the Register. In 1992, the first year of the Register, only ninety-five of the 179 existing members of the United Nations reported their arms purchases along with their domestic production and holdings. 95 The largest number of countries reporting was reached in 2001 when 126 of the 189 members of the United Nations reported to the UN Register. 96 In 2004, 115 countries had submitted a report to the Register. 97 All top ten supplier countries, with the exception of China, have regularly contributed to the Register since 1992. China, the eighth largest arms supplier and the largest arms recipient in the world between 1999 and 2003, stopped responding to the Register in 1998. 98 Although all of the major supplier countries, again with the exception of China, have responded to the Register, some major recipient countries have either not responded or simply responded sporadically. For example, Iran has not reported to the Register since 1998; and Egypt, Angola, Algeria, Syria, and Saudi Arabia have not disclosed any information to the Register on their arms transfers since the Register was launched in 1992. In the case of recipient countries, nondisclosure of arms transfers does not damage the Register greatly because the imports of these nonreporting countries are the exports of major supplier countries. This practice ensures disclosure of arms transfers.
Wassenaar Agreement (1996)
The Wassenaar Agreement came to life in 1996 after the dissolution of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) in 1994. 99 The main goal of the Wasennaar Agreement is to encourage "transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations" by creating "control lists." 100 Currently, there are thirty-nine countries that have signed the Agreement. All top ten suppliers, with the exception of China, are parties to the Agreement. The Wassenaar Agreement, in its original formulation, did not stipulate that the supplier country should take into consideration human rights conditions in the recipient country. However, an additional document entitled "Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons: Explanatory Note" defines some "non-binding" guidelines by listing two questions regarding human rights conditions in recipient countries.
102 Although these added guidelines "encourage" the participant states to consider human rights conditions in recipient countries, they are not binding. It is simply "recommended" that signatory states take these guidelines into consideration.
European Union (EU) Code of Conduct (1998)
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, when arms transfers to Iraq by EU member states was revealed, the EU started work on a document that would guide arms exports and standardize the national laws and practices.
103 The EU Code of Conduct (the Code), which has eight criteria binding the members politically but not legally, was approved in June 1998.
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While Criterion Two extensively deals with human rights conditions in the recipient country, the rest of the criteria encourage EU members to consider various conditions varying from "the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community" to "internal" and "regional peace, security and stability" when transferring arms.
105 The member states are expected to apply these criteria while issuing or denying arms export licenses.
The language in the EU Code of Conduct regarding human rights in recipient countries is more clearly defined, but still subject to interpretation. The ambiguity here lies in the criterium's wording. The phrase "might be used for internal repression" leaves the assessment of the possibility of repression to the supplier country. Furthermore, the Code does not specifically prohibit the transfer of arms to countries in which human rights violations are documented by various international institutions. Rather, it tells supplier countries simply to pay more attention, or as it is stated, to "exercise special caution and vigilance" in transfers to countries with human rights violations. 107 This wording makes the Code open to interpretation and limits its efficiency. Even David Andrews, then Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, was reported to have expressed his disappointment with human rights the criterion when the Code was accepted.
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In case of license denials, the EU members are expected to inform other members of these denials, as well as the reasons for the denials, "through diplomatic channels."
109 If another member decides to grant a license for an "identical transaction within three years," it has to inform the member state that previously denied the license and provide that state with reasons for the issuance of the license in question. 110 The denials and the consultations regarding these denials, according to the EU Code of Conduct, should be done in "confidentiality."
111
Various NGOs also argued that there were flaws with the EU Code of Conduct in general. The most important flaw is that the Code is not legally binding on the EU member states.
112 Amnesty International in a 2004 report argued that the Code had various weaknesses, such as containing language very open to interpretation, a review mechanism that was not transparent enough, and no provisions for arms brokering, which in turn, created serious loopholes in the Code. Furthermore, transparency and coordination problems have plagued the Code from its inception. It has been argued that because member states inform each other about the denials through "diplomatic channels" and "in confidentiality," rather than publicly, this further limits the transparency of the arms exports.
114 In the first five years of the EU Code of Conduct, for example, the Code did not even have a central database for denials issued for export licenses. The establishment of such a database was declared one of the goals in December 2003 in the Fifth Annual Report According to Operative Provisions 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The very same Annual Report accepted that "there is still work to be done," especially in the harmonization of reporting procedures and creation of a comparable statistical database.
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C. Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers adopted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (1993)
The OSCE Principles, like other international agreements, are not binding. These principles simply recommend that the OSCE member states "exercise due restraint" through their national arms export control laws when transferring arms to other countries and "take into account . . . the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country." 116 The OSCE Principles instruct the participating states to "avoid transfers which would be likely to be used for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms."
117 The OSCE Principles also assume member states will "reflect" these principles in their national codes regulating arms transfers.
The analysis of the domestic and international laws governing arms transfers of major supplier indicates that the real problem is not the absence of laws or codes. Rather, coupled with various transparency problems, the real problem is the ambiguous wording of these laws, which in turn creates serious loopholes for arms traders and officials issuing export licenses. Do national and international laws that both stipulate and encourage states to consider human rights in the recipient country work at all? Sometimes the media and the NGOs end up playing an important role by disclosing some of these controversial arms transfers to the public. In particular, the British media and NGOs have been quite critical of the current Labour government that promised "an ethical foreign policy" during their election campaigns but then made several controversial deals. In May 2002, according to a report that appeared in The Independent, British cabinet members were allegedly involved in persuading the Indian government to purchase £1 billion worth of Hawk fighter jets, despite the Kashmir conflict.
118 The same report also mentioned that British jets sold to Indonesia were used during the conflict in East Timor in July 1999. 119 In July 2002, the United Kingdom was plunged into a controversial debate when Foreign Secretary Jack Straw announced his government's intention to "'modif[y]' . . . the rules on arms sales to reflect the 'new reality' of the multinational defence projects." 120 Concurrently, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was accused of damaging the Kashmir talks by selling arms to both sides, he brushed these accusations aside by saying that "the idea that we shut down our defence industry in these circumstances I find bizarre."
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In Belgium, a country party to the Code, but not on the top ten suppliers list, the revelation of arms sales to Nepal in July 2002, a country with a poor human rights record, created a huge scandal. This scandal had two important consequences. First, it led to the resignation of the Finance Minister Magda Alvoet. Second, Belgium in October 2002 became the first EU country to make the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports a domestic law.
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Several controversial arms transfers by the United States have also received considerable media and NGO attention. For example, the possible sale of $3.5 billion worth of 145 Super Cobra attack helicopters to Turkey in the recent past was one such example.
In summary, given these lax domestic laws and international codes and regimes, it is difficult to expect that arms transfers to countries with poor human rights records will completely halt. However, in addition to the laws that govern arms transfers, the changing nature of the global arms market following the Cold War has complicated the situation. 
VI. THE CHANGING NATURE of THE PoST-CoLd WAR GLobAL ARMS MARkET
A recent Amnesty International report concluded that "it is short term profit making and political advantage that guide the bulk of the international arms trade." 123 That "profit" stems from the fact that arms trade is a big business for some countries. According to SIPRI estimates, despite the decline following the end of the Cold War, between 1995 and 2004, the annual world military expenditure has continued to fluctuate between $800 and $950 billion. 124 Of this amount, it is estimated that approximately $26 to $34 billion was spent globally on conventional arms trade in 2002. 125 The end of the Cold War has, however, twisted this "profit" scheme by leading to a decline in the domestic military expenditures of almost all of the top ten suppliers. 126 Although this downturn started to rebound around 1998, most of the major supplier countries have not been able to return to their Cold War military expenditure levels. 127 In addition to this decline in military expenditures, "profit" concerns that were relegated to a secondary role in arms transfers during the Cold War because of strategic concerns became more important than ever when the Cold War ended.
128 These changes had two important consequences. First, the arms market ended up becoming a buyer's market. 129 Second, in order to offset this decline in military expenditures and to realize economic benefits, some supplier countries and manufacturers in these countries have started to pursue more aggressive policies in their international sales. 130 For example, since the early 1990s, the US government not only continued to give loans to foreign government on favorable terms so that they could purchase American arms but also encouraged American embassies abroad to lend greater support to businesses involved in selling arms around the world. 131 The situation in Russia, on the other hand, was more dire. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the structural changes that took place in the arms market following the end of the Cold War damaged the Soviet military-industrial complex, which constituted one of the main pillars of the overall Soviet economy.
132 Overall, the end of the Cold War created a buyer's market in which arms supplies and suppliers became more abundant; outbidding other supplier countries became the norm more than ever.
One clear example of this outbidding can be seen in arms transfers to China. By becoming the major supplier of conventional arms to China since the start of the US and European arms embargo in 1989, Russian arms sales to China have substantially reduced the impact of these sanctions. Consequently, along with China, some major arms supplier countries such as France and Germany have called for the lifting of the EU sanctions.
In December 2003, the spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that "the EU embargo against China on military sales does not conform with the good momentum in [sic] the development of relations between China and Europe."
133 French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and EU Commissioner for External Affairs Christopher Patten approached the issue quite sympathetically. Even France issued a four-page document calling for "the establishment of a genuine 'strategic partnership' [that] presupposes the abandonment of a rational based on rewards and sanctions." 134 However, the European Commission has been unwilling to lift the embargo. 135 The spokeswoman for the EU Commission argued that the Chinese would need to demonstrate very clearly that progress has been made in human rights protection before a lifting of the arms embargo can be considered. 136 The Commission turned down the proposal to lift the embargo on China several times recently. 137 In a similar fashion, the Bush administration has also opposed the removal of the sanctions. 138 However, this American concern does not stem from human rights conditions in China. Rather, President Bush has stated that his main interest was to keep the arms race between China and Taiwan in balance. 139 As the Chinese example demonstrates, while the improvement in human rights conditions is debatable in China, the major suppliers are more than willing to replace each other in arms transfers. The EU and the United States initiated the embargo; but Russian arms transfers to China have effectively undermined it, creating frustration among some of the EU countries that would appreciate a client like China. Interestingly enough, while lifting the embargo against China was being debated in November 2005, the EU imposed arms sanctions on Uzbekistan following the harsh suppression of the Andijan riots that took place in May 2005. 140 Although these sanctions can be considered a way to show the EU's good intentions on human rights, as some observers have noted, it is doubtful that the embargo will make any difference. This is simply because Uzbekistan relies on Russia, China, and other non-European countries rather than EU countries for its military supplies. 141 Yet, the fact that some EU members are quite willing to lift the sanctions for China but will go after Uzbekistan raises serious doubts about the EU's human rights concerns in arms exports.
VII. THE OTHER SIdE Of THE COIN: SMALL ARMS, NON-MAjOR SUppLIERS, ANd BLACk ANd GRAY MARkETS
Most well-known records of global arms transfers, such as the SIPRI Yearbooks and the Grimmett Report, do not cover two important issues regarding arms transfers: small arms; and illegal and illicit markets, also known as the black and gray markets, respectively. Compared to the rest of the arms transfers, small arms transfers are lesser in value but are much more accessible by countries with poor human rights records or conflict, which in turn makes the competition in global arms trade tougher. According to the latest estimates of the Small Arms Survey, the value of annual global legal exports of small arms is somewhere between $2.4 billion and $4 billion.
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The largest legal exporters of small arms are the United States, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Brazil, and China. Although the exports from these countries are primarily for use in the Western markets, an unspecified amount of arms makes its way to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Colombia, Algeria, Bangladesh, Iran, Vietnam, Malaysia, Bhutan, Indonesia, and Ethiopia. 143 In the case of small arms, major suppliers not only face competition from other major suppliers, but from second and third world countries as well. Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, some second and third world countries, as well as some of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, have entered the global arms market, particularly in small arms. Although they were not initially successful in exporting on a large scale, second and third world countries have gradually managed to supply small arms to other third world countries. 144 However, the changing structure of the global arms market following the end of the Cold War led to a contraction in the domestic markets in small arms in Central and Eastern Europe, just as it did elsewhere. Coupled with this contraction in the domestic markets, Central and Eastern European countries inherited surplus arms that were left by withdrawing Soviet troops. 145 These excess arms forced these countries to find new markets abroad, sometimes illegally and illicitly. 146 Small arms were either secretly exported to nationally or internationally embargoed destinations; or in the case of illicit transfers, these arms ended up in countries that were not the legal destinations stated in the end-user certificates. Thus, while the dark side of the global arms trade is small arms trade, the darker side is the illegal and illicit small arms trade, estimated at $1 billion annually. 147 These second and third tier supplier countries do not dominate the global arms market and thus do not get ranked in the major suppliers list; but their arms, especially small arms and light weapons that are more suitable for the wars waged in the post-Cold War world, eventually find their way to unstable parts of the world. 148 For example, it was not only major suppliers such as the French, the Belgians, and the Russians that sold arms and ammunition to Rwanda before the genocide in 1994, but also a number of former communist countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. 149 Advocacy groups published numerous reports in the late 1990s and the early 2000s documenting the illicit arms trade from countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and South Africa. An HRW report published in 2004 detailed arms sales to countries such as Uganda and Angola involving Slovak firms and individuals in the early 2000s. 150 Similarly, different reports issued by HRW in 2001 and Transparency International in 2003 criticized the Czech Republic for selling tanks to Yemen and arms to Sri Lanka, Angola, and Zimbabwe. 151 In 2002, the Christian Science Monitor disclosed an arms smuggling ring in the Czech republic, which was illicitly transferring arms to Iraq. 152 Another HRW report issued in 1999, as well as various other reports, accused the Bulgarian government of turning a blind eye on the arms sent to various conflict zones around the world.
153 There were also claims that Serbia and Ukraine had sold arms to Iraq in the early 2000s in defiance of the UN embargo on that country. 154 Moreover, the unrecognized Transdniestrian Republic in Moldova is said to have five or six facilities producing "small arms, mortars and missile-launchers, for sale to the world's trouble-spots." 155 Another way non-major suppliers are involved in arms transfers to countries with imperfect human rights records is with the reselling of arms. These non-major suppliers, apart from selling arms manufactured in their countries, operate as part of the global gray and black market networks, reselling arms purchased from major supplier countries. In 2001 it was reported that the Democratic Republic of Congo and Namibia were selling arms that they had purchased from France to their neighbor Zimbabwe, a country embargoed due to its poor human rights record. 156 In 2003, Global Witness, an environmental organization, reported that Chinese-manufactured AK-47s and other arms were shipped to Liberia from Hong Kong ports in return for Liberian timber exports. 157 Although the picture created by the non-major suppliers is bleak, there have been recent changes in the laws that regulate arms transfers in these countries. These countries began to pass legislation that will, at least on paper, either prohibit sales to human right violators or conflict zones or make arms sales more transparent. For example, in late 2002, South Africa, whose client list in the late 1990s included countries such as Algeria, Angola, Congo, Egypt, India, Colombia, and Israel, 158 officially established a National Arms Control Committee that would monitor conventional arms sales. 159 The Czech Deputy Foreign Minister claimed that the Czech government had "altered the method of issuing licenses so that it respects in the best possible way the requirements of the [EU] Code." 160 Consequently, in 2004, the Czech government reported that it canceled the sale of a radar system to China along with nine other items. 161 Likewise, in 2002, Bulgaria and Slovakia adopted bills to regulate arms exports from their countries. However an HRW report argued that these reforms were far from effective in decreasing the violations in arms exports from these countries. 162 It is quite doubtful that these new laws in the second tier supplier countries will be any more effective than those in the major supplier countries.
VIII. CoNCLUSIoN: WHAT IS To bE DoNE?
This article examined the current state of the arms export control policies of major supplier countries, as well as arms exports to countries with poor human rights conditions. It began by detailing the top suppliers and the laws, both at the domestic and international levels, that they were subjected to while transferring arms globally. As this article has illustrated, most of the countries that rank as top suppliers are either "bound" or "encouraged" by law to pay attention to human rights conditions in recipient countries.
Unfortunately, despite all these restrictions, as illustrated in Figure 2 , five of the top ten recipients are classified as Not Free or Partly Free countries by Freedom House. Amongst the top sixty recipients, which accounts for almost 96 percent of the conventional arms globally transferred, the total number of countries with poor human rights is thirty. To make things worse, of these thirty, twelve countries not only have poor human rights records but are also involved in some form of conflict.
Overall, as illustrated in Figure 3 , it can be argued that laws, especially at the domestic level, could be effective in curbing major suppliers' enthusiasm in selling arms to countries with poor human rights records or with conflict. When the dominance of the United States and Russia in the global arms market is compared, Russia, with no domestic laws stipulating or encouraging it to take human rights into consideration, has a diversified client portfolio catering to twenty different countries with poor human rights records while supplying 30 percent of the arms transferred globally during the same period. In contrast, the United States, which supplied 34 percent of global arms, had only nine clients with poor human rights records. So, what can be done to make supplier states rigorously follow the rules so that national and internal laws and regulations do not simply remain words on paper?
In terms of strengthening legal regimes, several Nobel Laureates, headed by former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, have been working since 1997 on an International Code of Conduct. 163 So far, the development of this Code has been slow. 164 The proposed code aims to create an international code without the interpretive language of the existing codes by making recipient countries meet certain human rights criteria in order to be eligible to receive arms. In other words, the goal of the International Code of Conduct is to prohibit all arms sales to countries "unless" they respect human rights. This language is quite contrary to other existing international codes that allow sales "except" in the cases in which there are "clear risks" of human rights violations. 165 Recently, NGOs have started to play an important role in the shaping of arms control agendas. Their role, especially in the creation and implementation of the Ottawa Treaty, which banned antipersonnel landmines, has already been the subject of several studies. 166 In the case of conventional weapons, NGOs continue to be the watchdogs of states that apply laws liberally. In October 2003, three major advocacy groups, Amnesty International, Oxfam, and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), initiated a campaign for the signing of an international treaty that would provide better control of global arms trade. 167 These advocacy groups also continue to criticize the practices of major supplier states. The Amnesty International report issued in December 2003 argued that G8 countries, most of which are major supplier countries, fail to put any effort into creating a "coordina-tion mechanism" among the group and instead place the "responsibility" on recipient countries.
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In 2005, the idea of an international arms treaty gained speed one more time. In March 2005, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw declared his country's intention to establish an international arms treaty within the United Notions. 169 Following this, in October 2005, the Council of the European Union "acknowledged the support, in all parts of the world, for an international treaty to establish common standards for the global trade in conventional arms." 170 The Council also stated that the platform for such a trade should be the United Nations.
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Given the competitive nature of the current arms market, it is doubtful that major suppliers would be willing to embrace an international code with real and stringent controls on their arms exports. Furthermore, the US strategy following 11 September 2001, which has been to build "coalitions" at all cost, has resulted in the lifting of sanctions to countries such as India, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan and the increase of arms transfers to many other countries with dubious human rights records, creates doubts about the intentions of the great powers.
172 These recent developments demonstrate that what the world needs is a change in mentality more than a change in codes. Arms transfers to countries with poor human rights records have opportunity costs in terms of human and international security. Arms in the wrong hands likely worsen human rights conditions and curtail human development by draining precious resources in the recipient country. As the world witnessed during the first Gulf War, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere, weapons can just as well be used against supplier countries.
